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ABSTRACT.  Despite  formidable  physical  barriers,  mining  has  taken  place  in  Greenland for more  than 100 years.  Initially it was  by  royal  concession 
but  without  a  formal  regulatory  framework;  later  there  were  a  few  guiding  principles  laid  down by law and elaborated  administratively  to  suit  the 
occasion.  One  previous  attempt  had  been made to devise  a  policy  that  would  attract  investment,  but  the  resulting  mining  legislation did not  seem  to 
have  served  this  purpose. 
A  policy  review  initiated  in 1989 as a  result of a  growing  need for alternatives  to  the  ailing  Greenlandic  fishing  industry  recently  resulted  in  the 
enactment  of  new  mining and tax  legislation. The new  Mining  Act is the first step on  the road  towards  development  of  Greenland’s  resources. The 
real  test,  however,  wjll  come  when one or more  projects enter the  development  phase. Then  the management  of  the  impact  of  these  projects and the 
revenues  they  generate  will  be  central to a  successful  mining  policy. 
Key  words: Greenland, mining  policy,  economic  deve1opment;resource  extraction 
RÉSUMÉ. Malgré  d’énormes  obstacles  physiques, les ressources  minérales  du  Groenland  ont été  exploitées depuis  plus de 100 ans. L’exploitation 
s’est faite  tout  d’abord  par  concession  royale,  mais en l’absence d’un  cadre législatif et réglementaire;  il  y  a  eu  ensuite quelques principes  directeurs 
établis  par  la  loi et précisés  par  l’administration en fonction des cas. I1 y  avait  eu  précédemment  une  tentative pour créer  une  politique qui attirerait 
les investisseurs,  mais  la  législation  minière qui  en résulta  ne  semblait  pas  servir  cette  fin. 
Une  révision des politiques  lancée en 1989 et résultant  du  besoin  croissant de trouver  une  alternative à l’industrie  de  la  pêche  groenlandaise qui est 
mal en point,  aboutit à la  promulgation de nouvelles  lois sur les  mines et  de nouvelles  lois  fiscales.  La  nouvelle  loi sur les  mines  représente  le  premier 
pas vers la mise en valeur des ressources du Groenland. Le vrai test viendra cependant lorsqu’un ou plusieurs projets entreront dans la phase de 
développement.  La  gestion de l’impact de  ces projets et des revenus qu’ils généreront sera  alors essentielle au  succès  de la politique  minière. 
Mots clés:  Groenland,  politique  d’exploitation  minière,  développement,  exploitation  des  ressources 
Traduit  pour le journal par  Nésida  Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
July 1990 marked the end of mining at the Black  Angel lead- 
zinc mine at Maarmorilik, West Greenland, ending a long 
record of mining going back  to  the 1860s. At the same time, 
an overhaul of mining  policy got under way, concentrating on 
issues relating to security of tenure of mineral properties and 
taxation of mineral companies operating in Greenland. A new 
Mining  Act for Greenland  was enacted by the  Danish Folketing 
(parliament) on 21 May 1991, while at about the same time 
the Greenland Landsting (local assembly) adopted new tax 
rules for mining companies. 
The history of mining in Greenland and past mining policy 
is characterized by a strong awareness of the  need for a gov- 
ernment share in profits from mining, which has not always 
been accompanied by a  clear  understanding of what  these 
profits actually are, the nature of how the mineral industry 
functions or how mining companies are managed. Investors in 
mining have always looked at the previous system with  some 
scepticism, mainly because of the  problems surrounding tenure 
and  the  tax treatment of mining projects. The new Mining Act 
changes the security of tenure to mineral properties, taxation 
rules are moved to the regular Greenlandic tax code and the 
administrative framework is made more comprehensive. 
The objectives of this paper are, first, to briefly review  the 
history of mining in Greenland and the policy framework in 
which  it  has  taken place, and, second, to summarize the goals 
of the strategy report and to review the new Mining Act in 
relation to  the recommendations of the strategy report. 
MINING IN GREENLAND 
Since the Danish colonization of Greenland in the early 
18th century, mining activities have been few, far apart and 
commonly unprofitable (mostly small, local coal and peat 
mining). The two notable exceptions are the Ivittuut cryolite 
mine and the Black Angel lead-zinc mine at Maarmorilik. 
Zinc and lead have also been mined on a smaller scale at 
Mestersvig, in central East Greenland (Fig. 1). These activities 
have now ceased and this leaves Greenland without mining for 
the fist  time  since  the  beginning of cryolite  mining in the  1860s. 
Despite the limited number of operations, mining has made 
considerable contributions to the economic development of 
Greenland. Initially in the 19th  and  20th centuries the cryolite 
mine at Ivittuut financed all state activities in Greenland 
(Lyck, 1988), but after World War Two, and especially after 
1953, when Greenland  constitutionally  became  part of Denmark, 
public expenditure and investments have far exceeded the 
state share of cryolite revenues. From 1973 onwards, royalties 
and taxes from the Black Angel have made a small contribu- 
tion toward the finance of these expenditures, as shown in 
Table 1. The large amount of revenue in 1985 derives from the 
sale of a 50% share in Kryolitselskabet Chesund A/S, which 
operated the Ivittuut cryolite mine. The company had diversi- 
fied  into a range of non-mining  activities  not  related  to 
Greenland or mining (the sale was part of a government priva- 
tization program). The significant negative revenue in 1986 
relating to the Black Angel was  the result of repayment to  the 
operating company of taxes and royalties in connection with a 
restructuring of the operating company (Greenex) and change 
of ownership (from Cominco Inc. to Boliden AB). However, 
mining at Maarmorilik has also contributed significantly to the 
economic development of Greenland through higher incomes, 
increased employment and a positive contribution to the bal- 
ance of trade (Lyck, 1988). 
Until 1988 all revenues from mining in Greenland accrued 
to  Denmark,  but  according  to  an  agreement  between  the 
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FIG. I .  Map of Greenland showing the most important mineral locations  men- 
tioned  in  the  text. 
Greenland Home Rule Goverllment and the Danish minister 
for energy, future revenue (up to DKK 500 million annually) 
is to be shared equally between Greenland and Denmark 
(Mineral Resources Administration, 1989). This means that 
Greenland’s share will  not be subtracted from the transfer pay- 
ments from Denmark, which finance a considerable part of the 
Home Rule budget. Distribution of revenues in excess of DKK 
500 million is to depend on negotiations between Greenland 
and Denmark. 
The 1965 and 1978 Mining Acts 
The first comprehensive mining policy for Greenland was 
introduced in 1963, when a special commission made recom- 
mendations for a new mining act (Minelovskommissionen, 
1963). Before that time, only a brief royal’decree in 1935 and, 
before that, 18th-century mining tradition from Norway were 
used to regulate mining activities in Greenland (Harhoff, 
1985). The 1935 royal decree is most notable for its definition 
of all subsurface mineral resources as state property. The min- 
ing commission proposals for  a new mining act were enacted 
in 1965, although some of the details recommended were left 
out or modified. Two main issues were considered in the 
report: organization of mineral activities and economic condi- 
tions for mining. Both were discussed extensively, but the pro- 
posals in the report and, somewhat less, the final text of the act 
helped little to promote a mining industry in Greenland. 
When negotiations on Home Rule for Greenland were tak- 
ing  place  in  1977-78, control of mineral  policy  became a central 
issue (Foigel, 1980). Some Greenlandic negotiators wanted 
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TABLE 1. Mineral  revenues  from  Greenland 
Net gov’t 
Black  Angel  Cryolite  dividend  spending  Revenue  as
Year (lo6 DKK) ( IO6 DKK) ( I06DKK) % of spending 
1972 0.25 7.10 809.00 0.91 
1973 0.40 7.10 779.00 0.96 
1974 0.47 8.60 963.00 0.94 
1975 6.1 1 7.10 1131.00 1.17 
1976 10.56 7.60 1198.00 1.52 
1977 10.61 7.60 1237.00 1.47 
1978 2.05 7.60 1324.00 0.73 
1979 10.71 1  1.40 1676.00 1.32 
1980 32.36 10.70 1956.00 2.20 
1981 62.88 11.40 2058.00 3.61 
1982 37.25 12.80 2388.00 2.14 
1983 56.08 15.50 2488.00 2.88 
1984 32.84 14.80 2639.00 1.81 
1985 2.82 714.50 2759.00 26.00 
1986 -32.43 - 2727.00 -1.19 
1987 0.00 - 2642.00 0.00 
1988 0.57 - 2774.00 0.02 
Sources: Ministeriet for Grbnland, Yearbooks 1973-88; Mineral Resources 
Administration, 1989. 
full control, while the Danish government considered revenues 
from resource extraction a national and not a local matter - 
and by implication one of the few possibilities for recovering 
part of the  vast  sums  spent  in  Greenland  over  previous 
decades. As a compromise, the Home Rule Act only refers to 
non-renewable resources in vague terms when it states that-the 
resident  population  has  “fundamental  rights” to these  resources. 
When the Home Rule Act was enacted in 1978, important 
amendments to the 1965 mining act were also introduced. The 
central points in this modified mining act are summarized 
below. 
The main addition concerned the sharing of influence over 
resource decisions between the Danish government and the 
Greenland Home Rule through the concept of “joint decision- 
making power,” which includes a reciprocal right of veto. 
Other additions concerned the establishment of a  joint Danish- 
Greenlandic parliamentary committee to monitor mineral 
activities and  policy  and the creation of a Mineral Resources 
Administration for Greenland. The parliamentary committee is 
an advisory body, and formal decisions are made by the 
Danish and the Greenland Home Rule governments. The Min- 
eral Resources Administration represents the governments in 
all contacts and negotiations with mining and exploration 
companies (a major advantage) and relies on  the organizations 
attached to it (the  Geological Survey of Greenland and the 
Greenland Environmental Research Agency) for technical 
advice. The Mineral Resources Administration also has access 
to the facilities in the Home Rule system. 
Taxation of profits from mining activities was dealt with 
only briefly. Mining concessions generally had  to contain pro- 
vision for  a government share in profits “when capital invest- 
ment and a suitable return on the investment has been 
recovered” (Minelovskommissionen, 1963:25). However, 
exceptions from this main rule were possible and the govern- 
ment could claim a royalty even if the investment and return 
on investment were not yet recovered. Finally, it was possible 
to exempt mining companies from all other tax regulations. 
As its predecessor from 1965, the 1978 Mining Act  used a 
three-tier system for regulating exploration and mining activi- 
ties. Prospecting required a permit valid for up  to five years. A 
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permit did not require the holder to perform any particular 
kind or amount of work  and  might cover areas of widely dif- 
ferent size. A report on investigations carried out under the 
permit had  to  be submitted no later than  six months following 
its expiry. Discoveries of mineral occurrences always had to 
be reported and the prospector might be required to submit all 
the data generated. 
An exploration concession could be granted if the applicant 
was considered to possess the required skill and financial abil- 
ity. This was  an exclusive right to conduct exploration. How- 
ever, it incorporated no security of tenure to any discoveries 
made. The maximum term of the concession was eight years 
in  West Greenland and twelve years  in the more inaccessible 
East Greenland. In contrast to prospecting permits, exploration 
concessions contained work obligations that  were to be speci- 
fied separately in each case. The concession was forfeited if 
no work was carried out for  a period of three years, if the 
concessionaire was declared bankrupt or if conditions set out 
in  the Mining Act or the concession were not met by the con- 
cessionaire. 
A mining concession gave the holder an exclusive right to 
mine for a period of up  to fifty years. Such a concession might 
be given as a direct continuation of an exploration concession, 
in  which case the company holding the latter had preferential 
status if it fulfilled the requirements for a mining concession. 
These include that the holder must  be a company registered in 
Denmark  and  must possess the necessary technical and finan- 
cial resources. In special circumstances, the government might 
consider it reasonable to give the mining concession to another 
applicant, in which case the company holding the exploration 
concession was  to  be compensated for its exploration expendi- 
tures. Additional sections concerned use of local labour, sub- 
mission of plans, mine safety and forfeiture of the concession. 
These were not meant as specific guidelines but gave the 
Mineral Resources Administration power to determine conces- 
sionary terms in these areas. 
The  text of the  Mining  Act  was a policy  framework  designed 
to be filled in by the text of individual concessions. As a 
result, a number of administrative practices have evolved since 
the act was passed by the Danish Folketing in 1978. These 
were approved by the Joint Committee on Mineral Resources 
in Greenland and  in a number of cases they constituted signifi- 
cant policy changes. The most important of these was the 
practice of including options for state participation in explo- 
ration concessions for minerals in Greenland through an 
option for the state petroleum  and minerals company Nunaoil 
A/S to acquire a maximum of 50% of a project, half on a paid 
but low-risk basis (i.e., paying for a share after the results of 
the private investor’s exploration were known) and the other 
half camed by the private investor. Options of this type were 
first used in an oil concession in East Greenland but were sub- 
sequently adopted for all exploration concessions. 
Concessions also contained a number of blanket authoriza- 
tions that  enabled the Minerab Resources Administration to 
change or modify the terms of the concession. Any method of 
exploration or type of machinery could be banned  and  the 
Mineral Resources Administration could issue general regula- 
tions for the purpose of assuring workplace safety, and for 
environmental, preservation, resource, health and general con- 
siderations. Other administrative practices included a provi- 
sion enabling the Mineral Resources Administration to force 
different companies to cooperate on adjoining projects within 
a restricted area. A final but very important administrative 
practice was  not to give information on future economic con- 
ditions for mining operations (apart from the option clause) 
before a deposit had  been discovered and preferably also com- 
pletely delineated (Mineral Resources Administration, 1988). 
In the environmental field, administrative practice had 
always been based on an ad-hoc approach. Despite calls for 
standardized environmental regulation, it had always been 
maintained that each case will be one of unique interaction 
between geochemistry and the living environment on the loca- 
tion. Usually, a list of possible environmental investigations 
could be supplied by the Mineral Resources Administration, 
although the number and extent of these cannot be defined 
easily (Hansen, 1990). 
It  would  be an overstatement to  say  that  an established taxa- 
tion policy existed for mining in Greenland. As mentioned 
above, the Mineral Resources Administration generally took 
the view  that  such matters should be negotiated separately in 
each case (Mineral Resources Administration, 1988). Thus, an 
exploration company contemplating investment in Greenland 
could only be guided by the two old concessions given to 
Greenex  A/S  and ARC0 Inc. (for oil in East Greenland) and  the 
stated policies for government participation through options. 
The Greenex concession was comparatively simple on the 
question of taxation: Greenex paid  an “area fee” of DKK 1.1 
million annually in the final years of operation, a 5% tax on 
dividends paid to shareholders and a profit tax or royalty of 
45% of the annual concession profits. The profit tax  was  only 
imposed when the capital investment in the mine had been 
fully recovered. However, according to the Mineral Resources 
Administration 1987-88 annual report, the dividend tax con- 
cerning foreign shareholders could be deducted from the profit 
tax and could be considered an advance payment of this. In 
addition, Greenex was exempt from all other tax and customs 
regulations. The usefulness of these facts is limited by the 
absence of depreciation schedules and knowledge of conces- 
sion accounting practices. 
The East Greenland concession pertained to a petroleum 
project and contained highly detailed  specifications  for the 
course of the exploration project and the possible later produc- 
tion phase. During the exploration phase, Nunaoil A/S had a 
25% share on a carried basis. If exploration yielded favourable 
results and a discovery was developed, provisions for progres- 
sive royalty payments, standard corporate taxation and addi- 
tional state participation would come into force. 
Proposals for Change - the 1990 Strategy  Report 
In May 1990, the Mineral Resources Administration for 
Greenland published a report from a working group on min- 
eral resource development strategy in Greenland (Mineral 
Resources Administration, 1990). Dealing with overall strat- 
egy and goals for minerals, petroleum and administrative orga- 
nization,  the  report  considers the most obvious problems 
inherent in  the present system. These include government par- 
ticipation, taxation, security of title and information and mar- 
keting strategy. The report indicates that some significant 
changes in overall policy and administrative practice are on 
their way  in Greenland. 
The approach to mineral resource development adopted so 
far is characterized as “hesitant.” A legal framework and an 
administrative system have been established but little has been 
done to promote or market Greenland as a target for mineral 
investment (see also Wood, 1989). As Greenland was now 
without  any mining activity, it was recognized that changes in 
policy were required. 
The report recognizes that the basic conditions for attract- 
ing mineral  investment  are  stability and security of invest- 
ment, competitive terms, including simple administration, and 
easy access to information. Considering the need for more 
economic activity in Greenland, the overall goal for  a revised 
mineral policy is proposed as the creation of an industry 
(exploration and production) that can contribute significantly 
to the economy of Greenland.  The  attainment of this goal 
requires, first, a very large increase in mineral exploration 
(and subsequent production) and, second, that such activity 
actually benefit Greenland in terms of commercial develop- 
ment, employment, tax revenue, education, infrastructure, 
technology transfer and internationalization. At the same time, 
the costs (environmental, social, cultural, etc.) arising from 
mineral development must  be limited as much as possible. 
With respect to minerals, the long-term goal is to have two 
to four medium-sized operations at any given time, as well as 
a number of smaller ones. The short-term goal is to attract a 
“sufficient” number of international mining companies in 
order to define enough geophysical anomalies to reach the 
long-term goal (using 2000 geochemical/geophysical anoma- 
lies per discovery). 
Finally, the goal section discusses possible Greenlandic 
participation in mineral activities, including employment in 
exploration and production, supply of goods and services, 
downstream processing and local investment participation. 
Whether or not these goals can be reached depends on the size 
and stability of the  future  market,  the  level of exploration 
activity and the number of mines. 
Four elements  that  determine if the international mining 
industry will be attracted are identified: concession terms 
offered, legal and administrative framework, amount and qual- 
ity of information available and marketing effort towards the 
mining industry. The most pressing problems concern the con- 
ditions offered in prospecting permits, exploration concessions 
and mining concessions. The resulting changes are extensive 
and are discussed below. Hard-rock mine taxation is almost 
completely removed from the mining act, but the additions to 
the Greenland corporate taxation regulations are described. 
The New Mining Act of 1991 
The new Mining Act for Greenland (Lov nr. 335,.6 June 
1991) is in many ways significantly different from its prede- 
cessor, but the concept of legislation as an overall framework 
for specific concessions or permits is retained and, in some 
ways, strengthened. Within this framework, major changes 
have been made concerning tenure, taxation, closure and aban- 
donment of sites, and government-investor relations. 
The three-tier permit system is modified, with the initial 
five-year prospecting permit retained in unchanged form but 
with two additions that allow the minister for energy to claim 
a tax as well  as a fee on permits. These charges are additional 
to any expenditure arising from the processing of applications, 
which  may also be charged to the applicant. Combined explo- 
ration and mining permits are exclusive to the holder but can 
be separate for each phase, in which case the exploration per- 
mittee has a right to obtain a mining permit. Exploration per- 
mits can provide for a gradual reduction of the permit area and 
for specific work requirements. Mining permits can usually  be 
granted only to companies registered in Greenland whose only 
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business is activities covered by the permit and who possess 
the necessary skill and financial resources. As for the explo- 
ration permit, the minister may collect a fee for the mining 
permit. The term of  an exploration permit is ten years, renew- 
able for a maximum of three two-year periods. For a mining 
permit the standard term is thirty years, while the term for 
combined exploration and mining permits usually cannot 
exceed fifty years. 
Permits can also specify to  what extent Greenlandic labour 
is to be employed or Greenlandic suppliers, contractors and 
services are to be engaged. Alternative labour or suppliers, 
etc., may  be  used if special skills required are not available in 
Greenland or if Greenlandic suppliers are not competitive. 
A general plan of operations and installations must be 
approved  before  mining  commences. This also  applies  to  explo- 
ration permits, any installations in  and outside the permit area 
(e.g., infrastructure) and mine closure plans. The permit holder 
must supply all necessary information to the authorities for the 
processing of the application and  must also regularly report on 
activities and results. Conditions for reporting and confiden- 
tiality of information are to  be specified in the permit. 
Closure (temporary or permanent) of a mine or the end of 
exploration require that the permittee remove installation and 
clear affected areas. The exact terms are to  be specified in  per- 
mits, possibly including the posting of a bond  as collateral for 
reclamation. As part of the application for a mining permit, the 
applicant must submit a plan indicating how affected areas are 
to be left and prove that this is provided for  financially. 
Temporary discontinuation of operations is generally allowed 
but requires the approval of the minister and it must  be shown 
that closure plans can be carried out in case of permanent clo- 
sure. The minister can activate the closure plan if a mine has 
been out of operation for six  years. 
The permittee is liable for damages caused by the activity 
and must pay compensation according to legislation and  nor- 
mal Danish liability law. Permits can also specify  that the per- 
mittee is liable for damages caused by the permitted activity, 
even though the damage was accidental. On the other hand, 
this liability may  be reduced if the  party involved (i.e., the vic- 
tim) was grossly negligent. 
The summary above contains numerous references to  what 
the minister can do and what a permit can specify. This 
“operi” framework is not intended to be filled from scratch for 
each new application, but rather “standard” permit terms are 
formulated so that only smaller details have to be changed 
according to local conditions, etc. This gives the authorities a 
sufficiently flexible tool with  which  to manage mineral activ- 
ity  in a social and political environment currently undergoing 
rapid change (these.arguments are mentioned in the remarks 
presented to the Danish Folketing when the Mining Bill was 
tabled on 2 May 199 1). 
A significant part of the mining policy  reform is the adjust- 
ments made to the Greenland income tax act with respect to 
mineral resource companies (i.e., oil and mining). The 
changes include a tax reduction for downstream processing of 
mineral concentrates (10% of investment in secondary pro- 
cessing facilities annually), deduction before tax of funds set 
aside for site rehabilitation if terms for collateral for this have 
been met, unlimited carry forward of losses and a rule that 
assures that mining companies are taxed directly by the Home 
Rule Tax Directorate rather than the municipality in which  the 
mine is located. The last rule means that mines will  be  taxed  at 
the lowest percentage (at present anyway) in Greenland, 35% 
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of taxable income. In addition to these changes, the provisions 
may be replaced by alternative tax provisions if the mining 
permit so specifies. 
Mineral-Led  Development in Greenland 
Visions of mineral discoveries and huge benefits for Green- 
land have appeared regularly and with varying degrees of 
intensity in the past. Examples include the Malmbjerget 
Molybdenum Porphyry in the 1960s, uranium in the rocks of 
Ilimaussaq in Southwest Greenland in the 1970s and the Motz- 
feldt Lake Niobium, Tantalum and Rare Earth Elements pro- 
ject in the 1980s. With the new mining policy as expressed in 
legislation and in the strategy report described above, a major 
step towards realizing these visions has  been taken. However, 
both the goals set out in  the report and the  means  with  which 
they are expected to  be reached deserve some attention. 
Before embarking on  an effort to promote mining in Green- 
land, the basic desirability of such  an undertaking ought to be 
considered in detail. In general, benefits from mining are con- 
sidered to include higher labour and capital income (for 
domestic capital), both directly from a project and from sup- 
pliers and subcontractors involved, technology transfer, 
regional development, foundations for resource-based indus- 
trialization, higher net foreign exchange earnings and higher 
govemment revenues (both from mining taxes and taxation of 
incomes related to mining). Costs, on the other hand, are likely 
to include increased dependence on the outside world, envi- 
ronmental degradation and the effects of inframarginal pro- 
jects on non-mineral exports and export substituting industry 
(Gillis, 1978). 
In the case of Greenland, the strategy report emphasizes 
that benefits in terms of regional development, primary and 
secondary employment, technology transfer and improved 
labour skills are expected to contribute significantly to the 
overall benefit for Greenland. Experience from many develop- 
ing countries shows that the latter benefits most often do not 
materialize as expected (see Gillis, 1978:lO-11). An isolated 
mine  may during its development and production life provide 
significant employment, higher incomes and training, but only 
as long as the mine operates. There is no reason to believe that 
isolated mining operations will create much regional develop- 
ment of a permanent nature. When the mine closes the local 
economy is deeply affected, as experienced recently by the 
municipality of Ummanak after the closure of the Black Angel 
mine in 1990. 
. The extreme isolation of most promising mineral occur- 
rences in Greenland indicates that the traditional regional 
development argument must not be overemphasized in Green- 
land. The remaining possible benefits (except government 
revenue) depend very  much  on whether Greenland is in a posi- 
tion  to gain them. This requires a skilled workforce and able 
subcontractors, both of whom  must  be competitive. A way  of 
establishing these is to require the first concession holders to 
undertake training of non-skilled local labour. 
Government revenues from the mining sector are likely to 
come from three sources: taxation of the mining companies, 
suppliers and subcontractors, as  well as personal income taxes 
from individuals employed by these. Only the mining com- 
pany  itself requires special tax treatment. 
The special feature of mining companies is that they  have 
the opportunity to earn “economic rent,” i.e., a surplus above 
what is required to find and extract a mineral deposit. For each 
deposit, the size of this rent depends on the quality of the ore 
body and the efficiency with which it is extracted from the 
ground. By its definition, rent from mines does not include 
returns to capital exceeding what would otherwise be avail- 
able. This means that the natural desire of governments is to 
collect as much as possible of the economic rent (Garnaut and 
Ross, 1977). For several reasons this is not possible in prac- 
tice. First of all, 100% rent collection requires that there is no 
uncertainty about the outcome of the mining project. Second, 
capture of all of the rent would, if possible, remove any incen- 
tive for an efficient operation. The result would  be dissipation 
of any potential rents from a given mine. 
In Greenland, taxation of suppliers, subcontractors and 
employees is covered by existing tax regulation. The changes 
in the Greenland Tax  Act  mean  that  it is now also applied to 
mining companies, with appropriate provision for foreign 
companies to  get a home-country tax credit and to be taxed at 
a current rate of 35%. Additional proposals in the strategy 
report included tax-system incentives, such as tax holidays, 
processing credits (to encourage processing in Greenland) and 
additional tax credits, as well as use of special incentives to 
encourage Greenlandic and possibly also Danish investment in 
resource projects. However, only the processing credit sur: 
vived to become law. 
Six main factors affecting the main goal of maximizing rent 
collected by government from mining have  been identified by 
Garnaut and Ross (1983). These are neutrality of the  tax sys- 
tem, its stability (probability of changes to the system as per- 
ceived by investors), intrinsic investor risk (tendency of the 
system to reduce risk), maximum tax rate possible (without 
affecting the incentive for efficient operation), adaptability of 
the system to realized profit, government risk (i.e., reduction 
of variability of revenue) and revenue delay. Each of these 
factors should be considered when a general taxation policy 
for mining in Greenland is designed. In the present situation, 
,with the  wish to attract exploration investment to Greenland, 
one of the most effective incentives would be a tax system 
seen to  be neutral, stable and risk minimizing. 
Tax holidays, depletion allowances, additional tax credits 
and processing credits, as well as use of tax  system incentives 
to attract investment from Danish and Greenlandic taxpayers 
in need of a tax break, were mentioned as possible instru- 
ments, but nowhere were the economic implications of using 
such instruments discussed. Most of these instruments have 
commonly been used to mitigate the effects of a non-neutral 
tax system or to achieve other policy goals than rent capture. 
The remaining incentive is an allowance of 10% annually 
of investment in secondary processing facilities located in 
Greenland. Processing allowances are widely  used  in mineral- 
producing countries as an incentive to locate downstream pro- 
cessing facilities there. The problem with  such an allowance is 
that it acts as a subsidy for downstream processing by substi- 
tuting cheap feedstock for labour and ultimately acts to dissi- 
pate rent (Gaffney, 1977). 
Whether the incentive will have any impact is an open 
question, but downstream processing facilities will probably 
be located elsewhere  as  a result of poor infrastructure, low 
availability of skilled labour and the generally fixed structure 
of most mineral industries. If the incentive does work it may 
dissipate a modest proportion of mineral rents. 
It is important to note that any mining tax system must 
address the concerns of both the state and investors. Maxi- 
mizing rent capture and generating a stable source of income 
must  be balanced against the needs of investors in  an industry 
characterized by natural uncertainty and market cyclicity. 
Mineral economists have long agreed that ordinary tax 
schemes cannot be applied to mining without great difficulty. 
A simplistic solution known as the “resource rent tax” was 
proposed by Gamaut and Ross (1975, 1983). This has evolved 
into a more realistic regime in terms of stable government 
revenue, which includes three elements. The first is a small ad 
valorem tax on the value of mineral production. Second is a 
corporate tax that  includes  deductions  for  exploration  and 
research costs, as well as allowing carry-forward of losses. 
The third element is an additional profit tax that is  applied 
when a threshold rate of return has been achieved, thereby 
partly eliminating unacceptable windfall profits to investors 
(Kumar, 1991). 
The strategy report and the new Mining Act show a clear 
trend towards more general regulation of mineral  activities 
and  away from the previous, mostly ad-hoc approaches. This 
represents a shift in policy away from what resembles a “bar- 
gaining model” in  which concession terms are settled by mar- 
ketplace bargaining (Smith and Wells, 1975; Gillis, 1978). In 
this model, excessive profits to the investor will result in pres- 
sures for renegotiation (which in the end may give the govern- 
ment a greater share of profits). The alternative to the 
bargaining model is the resource rent approach advocated by 
Garnaut and Ross (1983), which emphasizes  fixed taxation 
rules for the collection of mineral rents. The applicability of 
the latter model depends, however, on the presence of compe- 
tition in the supply of investment. 
If this condition is not fulfilled, a case of bilateral mono- 
poly  will exist. Such a situation may  be caused either by the 
investor having exclusive access to markets or technology or 
by unique managerial ability, or by the investor having been 
given exclusive tenure to a mineral property. The first cause of 
bilateral monopoly  may exist in certain industries over consid- 
erable periods and in specific regions. The second problem of 
bilateral monopoly can, it is believed, be circumvented by 
agreeing on fiscal terms (in general or for  a project) before the 
start of exploration (Gamaut and Ross, 1983). In the case of 
Greenland, situations of bilateral monopoly may easily occur, 
especially if only a few companies want  to invest there. At a 
time when Greenland is almost  desperate  for any new eco- 
nomic activity, the bargaining power of  an investor becomes 
increasingly important and collection of a reasonable part of 
mineral rents correspondingly difficult. 
Greenland’s economy is relatively small (see, e.g., Lyck, 
1988) and labour supply is constrained by a small population. 
At the same time, one of the goals of the strategy report is to 
expand employment in the mining sector. However, many 
resource-exporting countries have experienced considerable 
difficulties of a type often called “Dutch Disease” with rapid 
development of a natural resource industry. The problem is, 
very simply, that this rapid development will  tend to bid fac- 
tors of production (e.g., labour) away from their current 
employment, forcing up  wages and, because exporters cannot 
pass higher costs on into higher prices for their products, thus 
causing existing export industries to contract (production for 
domestic use can pass on higher costs to the consumers) 
(Caves and Jones, 1985). For mining in Greenland, the prob- 
lem is likely to be the greatest in terms of labour availability, 
whereas capital will probably be foreign anyway. 
CONCLUSIONS 
With few exceptions, Greenland appears in the past to have 
been  unable to attract mineral exploration investment. Physical 
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barriers and unfavourable geology are two possible but uncon- 
vincing explanajions. Instead, inappropriate mining policy, 
combined with a generally hesitant attitude towards mining 
ventures in Greenland, is probably the dominant reason. 
The strategy report acknowledges both of these problems 
but at the same time it heralds a concerted attempt to attract 
the investment required for Greenland to benefit from the nat- 
ural resource endowment of the country. However, too much 
optimism is premature, for, despite numerous reports of inter- 
esting mineralizations in the publications of the Geological 
Survey of Greenland,  there  is  little  firm  evidence of the  existence 
of ore bodies  suitable for mining.  Only  continued  exploration  can 
change this. 
Assuming for the moment that deposits do exist, the next 
question is whether these resources can provide Greenland 
with the additional economic activity the country needs. It 
probably can, but success depends very much on how such 
development is managed. Rent capture is perhaps the most 
visible issue, and here the new  policy  may  be adequate but not 
ideal, the main problem being one of credibility: will the  tax 
rate remain constant or can it be expected to rise if profits are 
high? 
The other changes introduced with the new Greenland Min- 
ing Act are all significant improvements, even if one might 
query the many  provisions for taxes  and charges on the various 
types of permit.  The  improved  security of tenure and the 
“standard” permits implied in the Mining Act; combined with 
the central authority of the Mineral Resources Administration 
(i.e., no other bureaucratic interface between applicant and 
government), create a competitive framework when compared 
to other jurisdictions. 
The achievement of other goals than government revenue 
still requires careful handling, particularly with respect to 
technology transfer, permanent employment (i.e., beyond the 
end of a mine), dependency on mineral exports and investment 
of mineral revenues. The management of the economy while 
development and mining proceed  will determine whether  long- 
term benefits can be realized or whether government revenues 
and higher incomes are consumed when available. 
Development of minerals may also  strain  the  economy 
regardless of taxation, as an expanding mining sector draws 
factors away from other export industries. This phenomenon 
may be particularly dangerous in Greenland, where the total 
size of the economy  is so small  and  highly  dependent  on  exports 
that  just  one  or two  projects  might  produce  symptoms of 
“Dutch Disease.” 
Mineral development may result in significant government 
revenues, but at the same time these are notoriously volatile. 
Regardless of what policy is adopted with regard to the use of 
these  revenues, a way to  stabilize  the  flow of income is required. 
At a time when excitement in Greenland is running high as 
a result of encouraging  exploration  reports from the Skaer- 
gaard gold camp in East Greenland (see Sinding and Poole, 
1991), Greenland has taken a great step towards realizing its 
geological potential. However, a good mining act and an ade- 
quate tax policy are just the beginning. The real test will come 
if and  when Greenland has to manage its new-found wealth. 
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